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Abstract
The number of scientific publications is constantly rising, increasing the strain on the review
process. The number of submissions is actually higher, as each manuscript is often reviewed
several times before publication[1]. To face the deluge of submissions, top journals reject
a considerable fraction of manuscripts without review[2], potentially declining manuscripts
with merit. The situation is frustrating for authors[3], reviewers and editors[4, 5, 6, 7] alike.
Recently, several editors wrote about the “tragedy of the reviewer commons”[6], advocating
for urgent corrections to the system. Almost every scientist has ideas on how to improve the
system[8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14], but it is very difficult, if not impossible, to perform experiments
to test which measures would be most effective. Surprisingly, relatively few attempts have been
made to model peer review[15, 16]. Here I implement a simulation framework in which ideas
on peer review can be quantitatively tested. I incorporate authors, reviewers, manuscripts and
journals into an agent-based model and a peer review system emerges from their interactions.
As a proof-of-concept, I contrast an implementation of the current system, in which authors
decide the journal for their submissions, with a system in which journals bid on manuscripts
for publication. I show that, all other things being equal, this latter system solves most of the
problems currently associated with the peer review process. Manuscripts’ evaluation is faster,
authors publish more and in better journals, and reviewers’ effort is optimally utilized. However,
more work is required from editors. This modeling framework can be used to test other solutions
for peer review, leading the way for an improvement of how science is disseminated.
Typically, a reviewer is asked to evaluate a manuscript according to three main characteristics:
i) Topic (T ): Is the topic of the manuscript in line with the journal? ii) Technical Quality (Q):
Does the work use the best techniques? Are references adequate? Is the statistical treatment of
the data correct? iii) Novelty (N): Is the work groundbreaking? Does it convey new ideas and
methods? Accordingly, in the model each author and journal is defined by three beta probability
distribution functions, one for each characteristic (T , Q and N , Methods, Fig. 1-i). A manuscript
is simply a sample from the three distributions for the author (t, q, n - Fig. 1-ii). Once an author
has produced a manuscript, she has to decide where to submit it. In the current setting (CS), an
author is encouraged to choose optimally the journal so that the impact of the publication on other
scientists (number of readers, citations) is maximized and so is the impact on her career (grants,
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tenure). Let us assume that the impact of a journal is measurable (impact factor, eigenfactor) and
that the author is able to determine with precision the probability of acceptance of her manuscript
in a given journal. Then the author can optimally choose the journal by maximizing the product
of acceptance probability and impact (Fig. 1-iii). Note that this procedure postulates that authors
have a cost associated to the submission (e.g. time spent editing, reputation). If there is no cost,
authors will tend to submit always to the highest impact journals.
In the CS, once the manuscript is submitted to a journal, the editor assigns it to three referees.
The referees are sampled at random from those whose expertise is best suited for the manuscript
(Methods). The referees then provide the editor with an estimate of the three values characterizing
the manuscript. The more familiar the reviewers are with the topic, the more accurate their estimate
is (Methods). The author revises the manuscript (increasing its quality and novelty, Methods) and
the review process is repeated (Fig. 1-iv). Finally, the editor averages the t, q, and n values provided
by the referees and uses this averaged estimates to decide the fate of the manuscript. This is done
in the model by computing an acceptance probability (pa). This probability is the product of the
cumulative distribution functions of the journal for the estimate q and n, times a measure based
on t that determines the interest of the journal in the topic of the manuscript (Methods, Fig. 1-v).
The editor then accepts the manuscript with probability pa and rejects it with probability 1− pa.
In the CS, if a manuscript is rejected then the author will submit it to the next best journal, unless
it has been rejected 5 times (Methods), in which case the author abandons the manuscript.
In the alternative setting (AS, Methods), when an author produces a new manuscript, she will
submit it to a first pool of manuscripts (e.g. a preprint archive). However, to be able to submit one
manuscript the author must choose three manuscripts already in the pool for review. Therefore,
more productive authors are also the more active reviewers. Once a manuscript in the first pool
accrues three reviews, it is revised (increase in quality and novelty), and the reviewers are asked for
a second evaluation. Then, the manuscript is moved to a second pool (ripe manuscripts). Every
month, the editors of the journals evaluate the ripe articles. If an editor wants a manuscript for
her journal, she will bid on it. At the end of the month, authors receive all the bids for their
manuscripts in the second pool. In the case of more than one journal bidding on her manuscript,
the author will choose that with the highest impact. If no journals bid on a manuscript, the author
abandons it.
I implemented both the CS and the AS using 50 journals and 500 authors. To produce a fair
comparison, the same authors and journals are used in the two simulations. I ran the two models
for 10 years and tracked all manuscripts produced in this period (Methods).
A first coarse comparison can be done among the number of papers published. In the CS the
500 authors produced 14936 unique manuscripts in 10 years. Of these, 9526 have been accepted
for publication (63.8%), while 5410 have been abandoned after having been rejected by 5 journals.
In the AS, instead, 14683 of the 14984 manuscripts found their way into publication (98%), while
301 were abandoned. Also the number of reviews is extremely different. In the CS, on average
10.02 reviews per manuscript have been performed (the mean drops to 7.19 considering published
manuscripts only), while in the AS each manuscript receives exactly 3 reviews. 92% of the authors
published more papers in the AS (Fig. 2-i), and all the authors accrued more impact (computed
summing the impact of the journal for each of the author’s articles). Surprisingly, the average
impact for each author was also higher in the AS in all cases (Fig. 2-ii). Also, the AS system
is much faster: the average time to publication of the published papers is 21.3 months in the CS
(1st Qu.:11, 3rd Qu.:30), but only 8.65 in the AS (1st Qu.:7, 3rd Qu.:10) (Fig. 2-iii). From these
results, it seems that authors should prefer the AS: their articles are published faster, fewer are
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abandoned, they are asked to perform less reviews and they publish in higher-impact journals. Is
this the better system for journals as well? The system requires a much greater load of work to the
editors: every month they have to go through all the ripe papers, and this is likely to be a cost for
the journals. On the other hand, this cost in the CS is payed by the reviewers, that are typically
not compensated. 58% of the journals published more articles in the AS, with an interesting trend:
top journals (high impact) published more in the AS, while lower-ranked journals published more
in the CS (Fig. 2-iv). If we measure the average merit of manuscripts as the product of their q and
n values, we find that merit is higher for published papers in the CS (mean: 0.378) and lower for
AS (0.323). This is due to two effects: a) in the CS a larger fraction of manuscripts is abandoned
(their mean merit being 0.256), while in the AS only extremely scarce articles are abandoned (mean
merit 0.056), and b) the number of revision rounds in the CS is much higher, and each revision
improves the merit of the manuscript (Methods).
In the CS, abandoned manuscripts can be reduced by allowing the authors to submit to a
greater number of journals before abandoning manuscript. I repeated the analysis allowing up
to 10 submissions for each manuscript. This lead to the publication of 81.7% of the manuscripts
(instead of 65%). However, this also negatively impacted the publication time (mean 32.53 months
instead of 21.3) and the number of reviews (mean 14.20 instead of 10.02). This is a trade-off that
cannot be avoided in the CS.
This exercise represents a highly idealized peer-review process. All the reviews are useful, there
is no bias, and each revision increases the overall quality of the manuscript; authors always revise
their manuscript according to the referees’ comments. Moreover, authors can estimate exactly a)
their manuscript value (t , q , n) and b) the probability of having the manuscript accepted in any
journal. Note also that if the cost associated with a submission is very small, then authors are
practically encouraged to always submit to top journals, regardless the probability of acceptance,
rendering the system even more inefficient. The CS can therefore be seen as a best case scenario
for the current system of peer review. Note that in the AS submission does not depend on the cost
associated to it, as authors can not decide where to submit their manuscript.
Results suggest that a much more efficient way of reviewing manuscripts can be implemented:
publication is faster, reviews are efficiently distributed and proportional to productivity, authors
publish more and in better journals, better journals publish more articles. Moreover, there could be
other “social” advantages to the AS. Recently, several journals started providing “Open Access”
(OA) content. Typically, authors have to pay a fee to have their articles published as OA. If
the AS were to be implemented, OA would be free and guaranteed, as anybody could access the
manuscripts in the two pools (as it happens now, for example, for the arXiv.org). Scientists in
developing countries and poor institutions that can not afford subscription costs would be on the
cutting edge of science as their colleagues in more fortunate situations. In fact, they could access not
only articles that have already been sanctioned by journals, but also the manuscripts in the pools,
i.e. what will be published in the future. One could imagine that a scientist could read published
articles in her discipline, “ripe manuscripts” in her sub-field and even submitted manuscripts on
specific topics. A parallel can be drawn with the release of open source software: normal users
will install “stable” versions, but those who want to experience new features can install “unstable”
releases. Another advantage for the authors publishing in the AS is that their work becomes visible
as soon as the manuscript is submitted, speeding up the process of accruing citations and settling
eventual priority disputes.
Finally, the AS already embeds some of the changes that have been proposed for the current peer
review system[12], e.g. the creation of a database of reviews common to all journals[13], and the
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idea of a “Community-based Assessment of Review Material”[11]. Both are practically embedded
in the AS.
This alternative system, however, could give rise to different concerns. For example, forcing the
authors to review manuscripts could be counter-productive when there are no suitable manuscripts
in the first pool. Also, manuscripts of less interest could not receive reviews for a very long time.
Finally, nothing prevents the abuse of the system, where authors in cliques exchange positive
reviews. Editors could request additional “traditional” reviews for manuscripts whose reviewers
seem to be in conflict of interests, but this would slow down the system.
However, thanks to the transparency of the system, most of these problems could be easily
solved: studying the authorship network editors could find automatically the “distance” of the
referees from the authors, weighting their comments accordingly. Also, a rating system for referees
could be put in place so that authors and editors could assign a rating to each review. Reviewers
with outstanding ratings could be good candidates for editorial work, providing an incentive to
perform balanced and constructive reviews.
There is an infinite number of ways to implement a peer review system, and this work is a first
attempt to tackle the evaluation of alternatives in a quantitative way. I have examined only two
options, but with further developments the model can accommodate any variation on the theme. For
example, the simulations could be made more realistic embedding multi-authored articles, editorial
rejections, including a reputation trait to the authors, allowing referees to decline invitations to
review.
Methods
Author. Each author is defined by three beta distributions, T , Q and N . Each distribution
X requires two parameters: αX and βX . If both parameters are equal to 1, the distribution is
uniform U [0, 1]. The beta distribution is quite flexible, so that various shapes can emerge. For
all the simulations presented here, I created 500 authors according to three types. 50 were “broad
interests” authors whose parameters were extracted at random from uniform distributions: αT , βT
from U [1, 5], αQ and αN from U [50, 100], βQ and βN from U [5, 10]. These authors work on a broad
range of topics with very high technical quality and novelty. I then added 150 “specialist” authors:
αT , βT from U [10, 100], αQ and αN from U [5, 10], βQ and βN from U [1, 5]. The remaining 300
authors were assigned values using U [1, 10] for αT , βT , αQ and αN , while using U [5, 10] for βQ, βN .
All the authors have 0.25 probability of producing a manuscript at each month. All manuscripts
are single-authored. In the CS, authors re-submit a manuscript until it has been rejected 5 times,
in which case they abandon the manuscript as unpublishable.
Journal. Also journals are defined by three beta distributions. I created a list of 50 journals using
the following parameters: 5 “broad interest” journals (αT and βT from U [1, 5], αQ and αN from
U [50, 100], βQ and βN from U [5, 10]); 15 “specialist” journals ( αT , βT from U [10, 100], αQ and αN
from U [5, 10], βQ and βN from U [1, 5]); 30 “normal” journals (αT , βT , αQ, αN from U [1, 10], βQ,
βN from U [5, 10]).
Journal impact depends on its distributions. It is computed as:
I =
αQ
αQ + βQ
αN
αN + βN
1
z(αT , βT , αT /(αT + βT ), 0.1)
(1)
where B(α, β, x) is a beta distribution and z(αT , βT , x, 0.1) is a measure of the density of a beta
distribution around x. Note that in this case x is simply the mean of the beta distribution. If
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x + 0.1 ≤ 1 and x − 0.1 ≥ 0 then z is simply obtained by integrating the probability density
function:
z(αT , βT , x, 0.1) =
∫ x+0.1
x−0.1
B(αT , βT , t)dt 0.1 ≤ x ≤ 0.9 (2)
However, in order to ensure that the computation of the impact is fair for journals whose average
T is close to 0 or 1, the following has to be implemented:
z(αT , βT , x, 0.1) =
∫ 1
x−0.1
B(αT , βT , t)dt+
∫ 1−x+0.1
0
B(αT , βT , t)dt x ≥ 0.9 (3)
z(αT , βT , x, 0.1) =
∫ x+0.1
0
B(αT , βT , t)dt+
∫ 1
0.9+x
B(αT , βT , t)dt x ≤ 0.1 (4)
This definition of z(αT , βT , x, 0.1) ensures that journal with mean topic close to 0 or 1 are not
penalized. Therefore, the impact of a journal is simply the product of the expected value for Q and
N (first two terms) divided by the degree of specialization of the journal: if most of the density
is concentrated around the mean (highly specialized journals), then the impact will be lower, if
instead the density around the mean is low (the minimum is 0.2 for a uniform distribution, i.e. a
completely generalist journal) then the journal will have higher impact.
CS: submission. In the CS authors maximize the expected impact of their submission. If a
journal X has impact IX and the probability of acceptance in the journal (see below) for an article
whose values are (t, q, n) is pX then the “score” of the journal is pXIX . Authors rank the journals
according to the score for their manuscript and submit to the highest ranked first. The submission
happens 1 month after the manuscript is created.
CS: reviewers’ choice. Journals choose the reviewers for a manuscript according to their exper-
tise. The score of a reviewer X, whose T distribution is defined by αXT and β
X
T for a manuscript
whose topic is t is 1/z(αXT , β
X
T , t, 0.1) where z is the function introduced above. Reviewers who are
more familiar with the topic of the manuscript will therefore receive an higher score. Reviewers are
sorted according to their score (descending order) and three reviewers are sampled from the top 20.
CS: reviews. Every month each author completes each of the assigned reviews with probability
0.5. The review process is simply an estimate of the “true” values of a manuscript (t, q, n). The
estimate has an error that is inversely proportional to the familiarity of the reviewer with the
topic of the manuscript. We define δ as δ = (1− z (αT , βT , t, 0.1)) /2 where the αT and βT are the
parameters for the reviewer, t is the real topic value for the manuscript to be reviewed and z is
the function introduced above to compute the density of a beta distribution around a given value
(t). The estimate t1 of the topic for the first reviewer is extracted from the uniform distribution
U [max(t− δ, 0),min(t+ δ, 1)]. In the same way q1 is extracted from U [max(q− δ, 0),min(q+ δ, 1)],
and n1 from U [max(n − δ, 0),min(n + δ, 1)]. The three reviewers follow the same procedure,
and finally the editor estimates are obtained averaging the three estimates for the reviewer: te =
(t1 + t2 + t3)/3 and so forth.
CS: revision. When a manuscript is revised, its quality and novelty are improved. The improve-
ment tends to be smaller when the manuscript has been revised several times. The quality of the
revised manuscript q′ is computed as h(q, 0.1, k) where k is the revision number and h(a, b, c) is the
following function:
h(a, b, c) = a+
b
c
(1− a)U [0, 1] (5)
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The manuscript can therefore improve up to 10% after the first revision, but the subsequent im-
provements will be smaller and smaller. The same happens with the novelty. After the manuscript
has been revised, the reviewers give a second estimate. Both the revision and the second estimate
are instantaneous.
CS: decision. The probability of acceptance for the journal X with parameters αXT , . . . , β
T
N of the
manuscript defined by the triplet (te, qe, ne) is:
p(accept|X, te, qe, ne) = z(αXT , βXT , te, 0.1) ·
∫ qe
0
B(αXQ , β
X
Q , y
′)dy′ ·
∫ ne
0
B(αXN , β
X
N , y
′′)dy′′ (6)
Once the probability of acceptance for a manuscript has been computed, the editor draws a random
number from U [0, 1] and if the number is lower or equal than the probability, she accepts the article
for publication, otherwise she rejects the manuscript. The decision for one manuscript happens
the month after the reviews are completed. This acceptance function is used by each author to
decide where to submit the manuscript: the author applies the function to her manuscript for all
the journals, which then are ranked as explained above.
AS: summary of algorithm. In the AS a manuscript is created as in the CS. The following
month, however, instead of being submitted to a journal, it is sent to the first pool. When the author
submits a manuscript, she has to commit to choose three manuscript for review the next month
(this is required in order to keep the minimum time before acceptance equal for CS and AS). Once
a manuscript has been reviewed, it is revised, the reviewers give a second opinion (instantaneous),
and the manuscript is moved to the second pool. The following month, all the journals run the
acceptance procedure on all the manuscripts in the second pool. If they are willing to accept any
one of them, they bid on it. At the end of the month, authors choose for their manuscripts the
journal with the highest impact among those that bid on it.
no
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Figure 1: A flowchart for the Current System (CS) of peer review.
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Figure 2: i) Comparison among the number of articles published by each author in the CS (x axis)
and AS (y axis). ii) Average impact for each author in the CS and AS. The impact is obtained by
summing the impact of the journal in which each of the author’s articles have been published and
dividing by the number of publications. iii) Box-plot for the number of months before publication
in the two settings. The thick black line represent the median. iv) Number of articles published by
each journal in the two settings. The color indicates the impact of the journal: blue - top 25%, red
- bottom 25%. Lighter shadows indicate the quartiles around the mean.
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